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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1158 
___________ 
 
DENNIS SHIPMAN, 
                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SININA J. TALLEY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-11-cv-00460) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 6, 2015 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 8, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
  
 Dennis Shipman seeks review of several orders entered by the District Court in 
this diversity action.  Both parties proceeded pro se in the District Court, and proceed pro 
se on appeal.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
I. 
 On May 25, 2011, Shipman commenced this action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware against his ex-wife and former business partner, Sinina 
J. Talley.  Shipman alleged that Talley had unilaterally and unlawfully dissolved their 
joint business1 by liquidating thousands of dollars in stock, forging documents, closing 
multiple bank and credit accounts, and “pocket[ing] all of the monies.”  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 
7-9.)  Shipman asserted claims of breach of contract, fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sought compensatory and punitive 
damages.   
 On December 14, 2011, Talley filed an answer to the complaint as well as a 
purported motion to dismiss.  In her motion, Talley contended that Shipman’s claims 
were barred by the terms of a 2009 settlement agreement and mutual release.  Although 
Talley attached a copy of the settlement agreement to her motion, the District Court 
declined to consider issues outside the pleadings at that early stage of the proceedings and 
denied Talley’s motion.  
                                                 
1 The parties’ joint venture, Shipman Holdings LLC, was a “business [that] consisted of 
three building parcels, which housed a dollar store, convenience store, martial arts studio, 
and class c office space.”  (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) 
 
  
 On January 24, 2012, Shipman filed motions seeking a default judgment and 
sanctions against Talley.  Shipman claimed that Talley had failed to serve him with 
copies of her answer and motion to dismiss.  The District Court found that the record 
belied these allegations and denied relief on both motions.   
 Shipman next filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he had “come 
forward with sufficient evidence” to “establish all of the elements of his claims.”  (Mot. 
13, ECF No. 18.)  Shipman also again argued that he was entitled to a default judgment 
based on Talley’s failure to answer the complaint.  The District Court determined that: 
(1) genuine issues of material fact remained as to Talley’s liability for the alleged 
wrongdoing; and (2) to the extent that Shipman sought summary judgment based on 
Talley’s alleged default, the court previously made clear that no such default occurred.    
 On December 3, 2013, Shipman filed a second motion for a default judgment 
repeating the allegations he made in the first motion and in his motion for summary 
judgment.  Shipman also argued that he was entitled to a default judgment on the ground 
that Talley had failed to respond to his motion for summary judgment.  The District Court 
denied the motion, noting once more that Talley had filed and served her answer within 
the prescribed time, and explaining that her failure to respond to Shipman’s summary 
judgment motion was not grounds for a default.   
 On December 12, 2014, Talley filed a second purported motion to dismiss the 
complaint, again contending that the settlement agreement precluded Shipman’s present 
claims.  The District Court construed the filing as a motion for judgment on the 
  
pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), and this time granted relief.  The court explained that 
although it had initially declined to consider matters outside of the pleadings, it would be 
prudent to do so at this late date in the litigation.  The court then determined that the 
settlement agreement was a valid agreement from the New Castle County Family Court 
and that Shipman’s claims fell within the scope of the release provisions.2 
 Shipman now seeks review of the District Court’s orders.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
orders denying Shipman’s motions for a default judgment for abuse of discretion. 
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s order granting Talley’s purported motion to dismiss, 
which it effectively construed as a motion for summary judgment.3  See Jakimas v. 
                                                 
2 The District Court also denied Shipman’s pending motions for sanctions and a pretrial 
conference.  Shipman does not challenge these rulings on appeal.  
 
3  The District Court converted Talley’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) to a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) because she had already filed an 
answer to the complaint.  While the District Court was correct that Talley could not 
proceed under Rule 12(b)(6), the court should have construed the motion as one for 
summary judgment instead because Talley’s motion relied on materials outside of the  
pleadings—namely, the settlement agreement.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Rose v. Bartle, 
871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he label a district court places on its disposition is 
not binding on an appellate court.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 
F.2d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 1991) (construing district court’s disposition as the entry of 
summary judgment rather than a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), where the court did not 
exclude additional material attached to plaintiff’s motion to dismiss).  Although the 
District Court did not notify Shipman of the summary judgment conversion, we find that 
this error was harmless given that Shipman does not challenge the effective conversion 
  
Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).  A party is entitled to 
summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
 On appeal, Shipman primarily challenges the District Court’s determination that 
he was not entitled to a default judgment.  Shipman repeatedly urged the District Court to 
enter a default judgment in his favor on the ground that Talley had not served him with 
copies of her answer and motion to dismiss.  The District Court noted, however, that 
Talley had filed a certificate of service as well as a certified mail receipt demonstrating 
that she had mailed copies to Shipman’s last known address on December 12, 2011.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(c).  The District Court also noted that Talley’s answer was timely 
served within sixty days of the October 20, 2011 request for waiver of service.  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).  Under these circumstances, the District Court reasonably determined 
that Talley had fulfilled her service obligations under the federal rules.  Therefore, the 
District Court acted well within its discretion in denying Shipman’s motions  for default 
judgment.4  To the extent that Shipman also sought summary judgment based on Talley’s 
alleged default, the District Court properly denied such request.   
                                                                                                                                                             
on appeal, and has not identified any evidence that would have created a genuine issue of 
material fact precluding summary judgment.  See Rose, 871 F.2d at 342 (explaining that 
the failure to provide proper notice does not require reversal where the error is harmless).    
   
4 We note that Shipman did not follow the proper procedure for obtaining a default 
judgment.  Shipman was required to seek entry of default by the Clerk under Federal 
  
 Shipman also challenges the District Court’s determination that his claims were 
precluded by the terms of the settlement agreement and mutual release.  “We apply 
plenary review to a district court’s construction of settlement agreements, but we review 
any underlying factual findings for clear error.”  In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 706 
F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As an initial matter, 
we see no error in the District Court’s determination that the settlement agreement is 
authentic.  Although Shipman alleges that the document is a “forgery,” it bears the 
signatures of both Shipman and Talley, as well as Judge Mark D. Buckworth of the New 
Castle County Family Court, who approved the agreement by order entered February 24, 
2009.  In addition, the District Court was able to further confirm the validity of the 
document by directly contacting the Family Court.  We therefore defer to the District 
Court’s authenticity determination.   
 We also agree with the District Court that Shipman’s claims against Talley fall 
within the scope of the settlement agreement’s release provisions.  It appears that Talley 
filed suit against Shipman sometime in 2008 seeking to recover sums he allegedly owed 
on mortgage and credit agreements arising from their joint venture.  The parties later 
agreed to settle “all disputes and claims relating to all claims which have been or could 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) before seeking a default judgment in the District Court 
under Rule 55(b).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (b); 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682 (2007) (“Prior to 
obtaining a default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2), there must be 
an entry of default as provided by Rule 55(a).”).   
 
  
have been asserted in the Civil Actions or otherwise by the parties.”  (Settlement 
Agreement and Release p. 1, ECF No. 42.)  They further agreed to “remise, release, and 
forever discharge” one another from any “claims, liability, demands, costs, charges, 
expenses, actions, causes of action, setoffs, affirmative defenses, judgments, and 
executions, past and present, known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, whether or not 
ascertainable at the time of execution of this Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release . 
. . that arise from or relate to” the pending litigation.  (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.)  Given that Shipman’s 
complaint alleges misconduct that pre-dates the agreement, his claims clearly fall within 
the scope of the release provisions.  Therefore, we discern no error in the District Court’s 
determination that Talley was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5   
III. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm.   
 
 
                                                 
5 To the extent that Shipman argues that the District Court’s rulings in this matter were 
tainted by bias, we have carefully reviewed the record and detect nothing that raises an 
inference of bias.     
